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 1 Introduction
The last decade has seen the dramatic rise and fall of world-wide housing
prices, culminating in the nancial crisis and `Great Contraction' of 2008-
2009. This brought the nancial system to the brink of collapse and led to
unprecedented ocial intervention. Currently, politicians and central bankers
are busy putting the foundations of a new macro-prudential policy framework
which is meant to make the nancial system more stable and less prone to the
kind of boom-bust cycle we experienced over the last ve years.
Motivation and economic questions As Reinhart and Rogo (2008) doc-
ument in detail, there are many episodes of boom-bust nancial cycles but not
all of them result in a costly economic contraction. Some boom-bust cycles,
such as those in Japan and the Scandinavian countries in the 1990s, and the
subprime crisis of 2007-2009, led to banking crisis and a serious recession. But
on other well known occasions such as the 1987 crash or the dot-com bubble
of 1999-2000, the collapse of asset prices did not result in a banking crisis and
a severe contraction of real economic activity. Figure 1 below illustrates the
puzzle. Panel A of the gure compares the decline from peak of the S&P 500
during 2000-03 period with the fall of the value of the CDS on a pool of AAA-
rated subprime RMBS since 2007. Panel B compares the behaviour of GDP
growth over the two periods. The message of the gure should be clear. The
`dot com' crash was of a similar magnitude to the `subprime crisis' while its
output eects were small in comparison.
[Figure 1 here]
Why did the dot-com bubble not lead to a serious banking crisis while the
subprime bubble did? Should policy react to any sharp increase in asset prices
or are there occasions when the market can be left safely to its own devices
1even when nancial prices look to have departed from fundamentals? These
are the questions we ask in our paper. Some policy makers (most notably
Mishkin (2008) and Mishkin (2009)) have argued that we should only worry
about bubbles generated within the banking system. This view receives some
support from the literature on `early warning indicators of crisis' (Borio and
Lowe (2002), Borio and Drehmann (2008), Alessi and Detken (2009) as well
as many others). The literature shows that an asset price boom is far more
likely to result in a costly output collapse when it is accompanied by a large
increase in money, credit and bank leverage. In this paper, we formalise this
idea and show that who owns bubbly assets indeed matters for nancial and
economic stability.
Model description In order to analyse the questions addressed above, we
construct a model in which both banks and entrepreneurs are subject to credit
frictions. Entrepreneurs dier in their productivity levels, and those with
higher productivity become borrowers (and vice versa) in equilibrium. Fol-
lowing Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) they are subject to a collateral constraint
when they borrow. Following Gertler and Karadi (2009), the amount of de-
posits a bank can collect depends on its net worth. When those credit frictions
are severe enough, the interest rate is suppressed and bubbles can be traded
once expectations are coordinated. Using this model, we compare the case in
which banks hold bubbles and the case in which savers hold bubbles directly.
While not modelled explicitly, we interpret bubbles held by banks as indivisible
large bubbly assets, such as commercial real estate bubbles. Since it is much
larger than a typical savings of savers, individuals cannot aord to buy it, but
banks can do so by pooling savings of individuals. Bubbles held by individual
savers can be interpreted, for example, bubbles attached to equities. Those
2are divisible and savers can buy them.
Results The main point of our paper is to formalise the intuition that asset
bubbles held by banks (sometimes referred to as `credit bubbles') are more
dangerous than bubbles held by other investors who are less central in the
credit allocation mechanism. When bank-held credit bubbles burst, banks
become insolvent and need to be rescued by the government. The fall in their
net worth causes a severe credit crunch and output collapse. In contrast, the
eects of asset price busts on real activity are milder when savers directly hold
bubbles. The intuition behind the result is simple. When savers hold bubbles
it is those savers who suer from capital loss. But because the net worth
of savers is not central to the eciency of nancial intermediation, the costs
of the bubble collapse remain private rather than `systemic'. Borrowers and
other banks do not suer as a result of the savers' loss. In contrast, when banks
hold bubbles, bursting of bubbles directly hit the banks' net worth possibly
leaving them insolvent without government intervention. Because banks have
a `special' place in the nancial system, this fall in bank net worth results
in a `systemic crisis', a credit crunch and a sharp decrease in investment and
output.
In the nal part of the paper, we explore the link between nancial liberal-
isation and the tendency of banks to invest in bubbly assets. History contains
many examples in which deregulation has led to the growth of non-bank nan-
cial intermediation and a decline in the protability of traditional lending and
deposit-taking activities. Very often, banks have reacted to such developments
by trying to branch out into alternative lines of business with disastrous con-
sequences. To model such a situation, we extend our framework by allowing
direct intermediation via a `corporate bond market' and examine banks' re-
3action to the growth of non-bank lending. We nd that banks are much more
likely to invest in bubbly assets following such a `nancial liberalisation'.
Literature review Motivated by the recent global economic stagnation fol-
lowing the subprime crisis of the US, there is growing literature on models of
economic 
uctuations that emphasise the role of credits. A number of papers
incorporate various forms of credit frictions and study the way those frictions
amplify the eects of technology and/or nancial shocks (Kiyotaki and Moore
(2009), Christiano et al. (2010), Gertler and Karadi (2009), Gertler and Kiy-
otaki (2010)). The literature nds the importance of credit shocks (shocks
to net worth of borrowers or banks) but it is not easy to identify what they
are in reality. An example of shocks that change the value of rms and bank
net worth used in the literature is a shock that makes rms capital obsolete
(Gertler and Karadi (2009), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010)). However, it is not
very obvious how such shocks indeed occurred during every boom-bust cycles.
Instead, following Martin and Ventura (2010), our explanation of the crisis is
based on changes in investor expectations rather than changes in technology
and/or nancial shocks. Collapse of bubbles in our model serves as credit
shocks to the banking sector.
Our paper contributes to the recent growing literature on rational bubbles
under credit frictions, pioneered by Ventura (2010) and subsequent work in-
cludes Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006), Kocherkalota (2009), Arce and
Lopez-Salido (2008), Martin and Ventura (2010), Farhi and Tirole (2010), Hi-
rano and Yanagawa (2010). Ever since the seminal work of Tirole (1985),
the `rational bubbles' literature has been very interested in the question of
whether bubbles are expansionary for aggregate economic activity or not. The
traditional view was that bubbles replace excessive investment and therefore
4have a contractionary impact on total output. Subsequent papers have shown
that when there are credit market imperfections, bubbles may have an expan-
sionary eect through a variety of mechanisms that determine entrepreneurs'
current net worth and access to leverage.
In Martin and Ventura (2010) the expansionary eect of bubbles arises
because the anticipated prots from future bubble sales are collateralisable
and allow entrepreneurs to increase borrowing in the current period. As a re-
sult more production to be undertaken by the most productive entrepreneurs,
thereby increasing aggregate TFP. In Farhi and Tirole (2010) bubbles in-
crease interest rates and actually reduce the leverage available to borrowing
entrepreneurs through what Farhi and Tirole (2010) call the `competition ef-
fect'. This is negative for investment. However there is a positive `liquidity
eect'. When entrepreneurs need a means of saving in between investment
opportunities, the increase in interest rates makes them richer when the in-
vestment opportunity nally comes.
Our model contains some of the channels discussed in the literature as well
as some novel ones. We have a `liquidity eect' because bubbles enhance the
rate of return of those saving in anticipation of future investment opportunities.
We also have a `competition eect' though it is somewhat less prominent than
in Farhi and Tirole (2010) because bubbles simultaneously increase interest
rates and reduce production costs (real wages in our case).
The new channels we introduce arise due to the presence of credit con-
strained nancial intermediaries in our model. This oers several alternative
and complementary mechanisms through which bubbles generate lending and
output booms. In our model, limited nancial market participation is key be-
cause it allows banks to borrow at the deposit rate in order to issue loans (or
buy bubbles) whose rate of return is higher than the deposit rate. Following
5Gertler and Karadi (2009) the net present value of such spreads (the franchise
value of banks) is collateralisable and therefore changes in the spread increase
banks' ability to collect deposits. During a bubbly episode, the net worth of
borrowing entrepreneurs rises as they sell bubbles, increasing loan demand and
pushing up loan-deposit spreads.As a result, the value of the bank (including
the franchise value of future spreads) increases, leading to a rapid expansion
of deposits. Thus, lending to entrepreneurs increases even in the case in which
bubbles compete with `real loans' in banks' portfolios. This channel is similar
in spirit to the collateralisability of prots from future bubbles sales discussed
in Martin and Ventura (2010) but the mechanism is dierent because it relies
on the expansion of bank rather than corporate balance sheets. Our approach
is complementary to theirs and, we believe, particularly useful for analysing
nancial stability issues.
Plan of the paper Section 2 introduces the economic environment, section
3 describes the bubble-free equilibrium and discusses the conditions for the
existence of bubbles. Section 4 describes the bubbly equilibrium and uses a
calibrated version of the model to discuss the eect of bubbles' emergence and
collapse on nancial stability. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
The economy is populated with three kinds of agents. There are continuum of
innitely lived entrepreneurs and a continuum of innitely lived workers both
of measure 1. There is also a continuum of bankers who have nite lives and
can die with probability 1   
 in any period, conditional on being alive in the
previous period.
62.1 Entrepreneurs
Each entrepreneur is endowed with a constant returns to scale production





t is a productivity parameter which is known at time t.
In each period some rms are productive (ai
t = aH) and the others are
unproductive (ai
t = aL < aH). Each entrepreneur shifts stochastically between
productive and unproductive states following a Markov Process. Specically,
a productive entrepreneur in this period may become unproductive in the next
period with probability ; and an unproductive entrepreneur in this period may
become productive with probability n. This probability is independent across
entrepreneurs and over time. This Markov process implies that the fraction of
productive entrepreneurs is stationary over time and equal to n=(1+n), given
that the economy starts with such population distribution. We assume that
the probability of the productivity shifts is not too large:
 + n < 1: (2)
This assumption implies that the productivity of each agent is persistent.







Entrepreneurs purchase consumption (ct), bubbles (mt) at price t and
bonds bt. They also pay wage bills wtht in order to receive future revenues
7aiht. Here wt denotes real wage. The budget constraint of the entrepreneurs
is given by
ct + wtht + mtt   bt = a




t is the interest rate which is equal to the loan rate Rl
t when the
entrepreneur is a borrower and Rd
t when he is a saver.
Due to limited commitment in the credit market, agents will only honour
their promises if it is in their interests to do so. We assume that only a
fraction of the value of the rm can be seized by creditors. Hence the collateral







t=wt; 0 <  < 1 (5)
They maximise (3) subject to (4) and (5).
2.2 Workers
Unlike the entrepreneurs, the workers do not have production technology nor
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8here superscript `w' stands for `workers'. In equilibrium, it is shown that
workers do not save because the equilibrium deposit rate is low. Therefore
they consume their labour income in each period.
2.3 Banks
We assume that savers cannot directly lend to borrowers and that lending is
done by banks. Bankers are risk neutral and live for a stochastic length of
time. Once bankers receive an \end of life" shock, they liquidate all their
asset holdings and consume all of them before exiting. This shock hits with
probability 1   
:
Banks maximize the following objective function:
V (nt) = c
b
t + Et [
V (nt+1) + (1   
)nt+1] (8)
subject to a number of constraints explained below.
In each period the bank has net worth (nt). It collects deposits (dt) from
the savers. Then it lends to the borrowers (lt), purchases bubbles (t), or
consumes (cb
t). Therefore its balance sheet is given by
c
b
t + lt + tmt = nt + dt: (9)
The evolution of net worth is given by
nt+1 = R
l
tlt + t+1mt   R
d
tdt: (10)
Following Gertler and Karadi (2009), we model banks subject to limited com-
mitment. More specically, the banker may divert 1    fraction of deposits.
Once he diverts, he will close his bank and the savers can retain the remaining
9 fraction of deposits. Since the savers recognise the banker's incentive to di-
vert funds, they will restrict the amount of deposit. Those assumptions imply
the following borrowing constraint
(1   )dt 6 V (nt): (11)
The left hand side of equation (11) is the value when the banker diverts, while
the right hand side is the value when he did not (i.e., the continuation value
of the bank). We also assume that the bank cannot short mt. The bank
maximises (8) subject to (9), (10) and (11).
3 Equilibrium without bubbles
Before characterising an equilibrium with bubbles it is informative to char-
acterise the equilibrium without bubbles because it provides us the condition
under which bubbles circulate in the economy. In this section we set t = 0 at
all times.
3.1 Optimal behaviour
The entrepreneur has a few choices of accumulating net worth. Let Rt(at) be
the maximum rate of return on the net worth from time t to t + 1 for the














The rst term in the right hand side is the deposit rate. The second term is
the rate of return of bubbles. The third term is the rate of return on pro-
duction without borrowing. The last term is the rate of return on production
10with maximum borrowing. By borrowing from banks secured by  fraction of
output, the entrepreneur can nance externally at=Rl
t amount (equation (5)).
Therefore the denominator is the required downpayment for the unit labour
cost. The numerator is the output after repaying debt.
Note that the last two rates of return in equation (12) are strictly higher
for the productive entrepreneur than the unproductive entrepreneur, and the
deposit rate and the rate of return of bubbles are the same for both. Therefore
in equilibrium the unproductive entrepreneurs supply deposits and produce if
and only if their rate of return of production is equal to the deposit rate. We









Intuitively, the borrowing constraints are tight enough so that the productive
entrepreneurs cannot absorb all national saving. Then there is not enough
demand for deposits. In such case the savers use both bank deposits and its
own production technology to accumulate wealth.










Given the optimal choice of accumulating wealth, the budget constraint (4)
can be written as
zt+1 = Rt(at)(zt   ct); (15)
where
zt = yt   R
i
t 1bt 1; i = d;l (16)
denotes the net worth of the entrepreneur at time t: Positive bt implies that
11he borrows and the lending rate Rl
t applies to his debt. Similarly negative bt
represents deposit and Rd
t applies.
Since utility function is logarithmic, consumption decision is given by
ct = (1   )zt: (17)
When Rt(aH) > Rl
t the productive entrepreneurs produce with their borrowing






Regarding the workers, their labour supply hs











Later we will verify this is true in the neighbourhood of the steady state
equilibrium.
Finally, let us characterise the bank. When Rl
t > Rd
t, then credit constraint
(11) binds and consumption is postponed until death. Guess that the value of
the bank is a linear function of net worth nt
V (nt) = tnt (21)
Here t can be interpreted as the bank's leverage. Then, with equation (11)

























Note that the above formulas show that t increases when t+1 increases.
This implies that the current leverage depends on the future franchise value
of the bank which is re
ected by the leverage next period.1 It also shows that
t is an increasing function of the spread Rl
t   Rd
t:
3.2 Aggregation and market clearing
Let ZH
t and ZL
t respectively denote aggregate wealth of the productive and
unproductive entrepreneurs. Then we can characterise the aggregate equi-
librium as follows. From (18) the aggregate employment of the productive









When (13) holds, the unproductive entrepreneurs are indierent between mak-





t   Dt (25)
where Dt denotes aggregate deposit.
1See Nikolov (2010), who considers a similar problem for rms.
13Let us turn to banks. Under the banks binding borrowing constraint, the







 fraction of banks exits in each period by liquidating all their
net worth. Therefore the aggregate net worth of the operating banks is given
by 
Nt:The aggregate balance sheet of the operating banks is given by
Dt + 
Nt = Lt: (27)
Let us turn on the transition of state variables. Note that the unproductive
entrepreneurs become productive in the next period with probability n and
the productive entrepreneurs continues to be productive with probability 1 .
Their rates of return are given by (14) and (13). Therefore net worth of the
productive entrepreneurs evolves from (14), (15) and (17) as
Z
H


















































The markets for goods, labour, capital, loan and deposit must clear. Goods








































t=0 such that: (i) entrepreneurs, banks







evolution of aggregate states, prices and idiosyncratic productivity opportuni-






t=0 clears the goods, labour,







t=0 is consistent with the individual choices of en-
trepreneurs, banks and workers and with the exogenous evolution of productive
opportunities at the individual rm level.





t , Yt; t, Dt, Lt, ZH
t+1, ZL




153.3 Existence of bubbly equilibria
Now we characterise the deposit rate Rd
t and loan rate Rl
t in the steady state
without bubbles and discuss when bubbles can circulate. In the steady state,
all 12 endogenous variables are constant. Credit frictions suppress the interest
rates and those rates are lower than 
 1 when the credit constraints bind.2
Similarly to Farhi and Tirole (2010), whether a bubbly steady state exists and
who owns bubbles depend on whether the two interest rates are lower than the
growth rate (which we assume is equal to 1) in the `no bubbles' steady state.
In our economy, the severity of credit frictions is represented by two pa-
rameters,  and : Figure 2a shows the region of  and  in which the deposit
rate is less than one and low productivity agents produce in equilibrium (the
red area). In this case, the savers (unproductive entrepreneurs) have incentive
to buy bubbles in order to boost the rate of return they receive on their sav-
ings. The blue parts of the graph show parts of the parameter space where the
economy is very credit constrained. At such low values of  and  low produc-
tivity entrepreneurs are active but wages are so low that even such inecient
projects deliver a rate of return greater than unity. As a result, savers have
no incentive to hold bubbles in such economies. The white parts of the graph
(very high values of  and ) shows parts of the parameter space where low
productivity entrepreneurs do not produce because the nancial system is well
developed. Here again, the rate of return on deposits is greater than unity and
savers have no incentive to hold bubbles. So it should be clear from Figure
2b that the conditions for the existence of bubbles is satised at intermediate
levels of nancial development.
[Figure 2a here]
2See Aoki et al. (2009)) for the general discussion of the relationship between the interest
rate and credit frictions.
16The red area of Figure 2b shows the region in which the loan rate is less
than one. Then the banks have an incentive to buy bubbles. Since the deposit
rate is always lower than the loan rate, the savers also have incentive to hold
bubbles at these parameter values. It is natural that the part of the parameter
space where banks bubbles can exist is more limited compared to the parts
of the parameter space where saver bubbles exist. Because banks' borrowing
constraints bind, this introduces a positive spread between lending and deposit
rates. Hence the parameter space where bank bubbles exist is a subset of the
space where savers have an incentive to invest in bubbly assets.
[Figure 2b here]
4 Equilibrium with bubbles
4.1 Competitive equilibrium with bubbles
In our model, either the banks, the savers, or both, can invest in bubbles. In
what follows we analyse each ease separately. In this paper we restrict our
attention to deterministic bubbles. In order to analyse the implications of
who owns bubbles for the economy, it is sucient to consider deterministic
bubbles.3
When the banks hold bubbles, this must imply that they are indierent






otherwise, either bubbles do not circulate or lending becomes zero.4 When the
spread between the loan rate and the deposit rate is positive, bubbles are also
3In a companion paper Aoki and Nikolov (2011), we consider stochastic bubbles and
draw implications for macroprudencial policy.
4As is discussed in the previous section, in this case we are prohibiting the entrepreneurs
(and workers) from buying bubbles.
17attractive to the savers. Firstly, we allow only banks to hold bubbles. In other
words we assume limited participation. Even though not modelled explicitly,
what we have in mind is the situation in which bubbles are attached to large
indivisible assets such as commercial real estate. In such a case, individual
savers cannot aord to buy bubbles because their savings are too small. How-
ever, the banks could buy bubbles by pooling savings from individual savers.
Thus the pooling of small depositors' savings is one of the fundamental func-
tions of nancial intermediaries in our model. Another story we could tell is
that bubbles are sometimes attached to assets which are not easy for individ-
ual savers to trade, due to transaction costs for example. Again, only banks
will hold bubbles in such an environment.
When (34) holds, the banks value function t is still given by equation
(23) because bubbles and loans are perfect substitutes to them. For the same
reason, the transition equation of the aggregate bank net worth remains the
same as (31). Without loss of generality, we normalise the aggregate supply of
bubbles equal to one. Then the aggregate value of bubble is equal to t. The
balance sheet of banks (equation (27)) is now given by
Dt = 
Nt = Lt + t: (35)
Secondly, we allow both banks and savers to buy bubbles. This corresponds to
a situation in which bubbles are attached to more divisible and standardised
assets, such as equities. Then individual savers can aord to buy the bubble.










We continue to focus our analysis on the case in which the savers produce by
18themselves as well as making deposits. It turns out that in such an equilibrium,
only the savers hold bubbles as long as there is a positive spread between the
deposit rate and the loan rate. This is because the savers' opportunity cost
of holding bubbles is the deposit rate while the bank's opportunity cost is the
loan rate which is higher than the deposit rate. The rate of return of bubbles
is equal to the deposit rate, so the savers crowd out banks from bubbly asset
markets.









This means that the banks will compete with the savers only if their spread be-
comes zero. In Section 6 we analyse the situation in which (36) holds following
a form of nancial liberalisation.
For all the three cases, since a part of national savings is invested in bubbles,










t ) + t: (37)
The other equilibrium conditions remain the same as Section 3.
Next, let us discuss the initial period when bubbles show up. We assume
that the productive entrepreneurs will create bubbles. Suppose that bubbles
0 show up at time t = 0. This is pure gain for the productive entrepreneurs.
Therefore their net worth equation (28) is given by
Z
H










 1 + 0: (38)
They sell bubbles to nance employment. Now equations (13), (23)-(26), (28)-




t , Yt; t, Dt,
Lt, ZH
t+1, ZL
t+1, Nt+1, t with three states ZH
t , ZL
t , Nt: At t = 0, ZH
0 is given
by (28).




















t=0 such that: (i) entrepreneurs, banks







evolution of aggregate states, prices and idiosyncratic productivity opportuni-






t=0 clears the goods,
labour, capital, loan, bubble and deposit markets and (iii) the equilibrium evo-






t=0 is consistent with the individual
choices of entrepreneurs, banks and workers and with the exogenous evolution
of productive opportunities at the individual rm level.
As many other models of rational bubbles, our economy has many kinds of
bubbly equilibria depending on agents' expectations. Our strategy is to look at
a bubbly equilibrium that can at least qualitatively explain boom-burst cycles
we observed in reality. Much literature on economic 
uctuations search shocks
such as productivity and credit shocks that can realistically explain data once
those shocks are put into DSGE models. Conceptually we are doing a similar
exercise but instead of fundamental shocks we are searching for expectational
shocks (such as investor sentiments).
4.2 Calibration
Since the analytical solution is not available, we discuss the properties of the
model based on numerical simulations. We have 8 parameters f, aH=aL, ; n;
; 
; ;  g we need to calibrate before we proceed to examine the quantitative
20predictions of our model economy. There is little consensus regarding , the
Frisch elasticity of labour supply. Micro-data evidence suggests a value close
to zero based on the labour supply behaviour of primary earners. The real
business cycles literature usually sets a much higher value in the region of 3
or even higher. The dierences is justied by the presence of labour market
frictions that ensure that aggregate labour is highly elastic even though indi-
viduals are relatively unwilling to vary their market hours over time. Gertler
and Kiyotaki (2010) make this argument and set the Frisch elasticity to 10
in their model. We pick a value of  = 5, which is within the range set in
calibrating macro models.
aH=aL is an important parameter, whose value is also highly uncertain. As
studies such as Bernard et al. (2003) and Syverson (2004) have documented,
the dispersion of plant level productivity in US manufacturing is enormous,
with the most productive plants having more than 4 times more productive
compared to the least productive. But as Aoki et al. (2009) argue, it is hard
to believe that such a huge dispersion of productivity levels is entirely due to
the presence of credit constraints. More likely, inputs could be mismeasured in
a number of ways. For example, intangible assets such as managerial quality
could be an important missing input which could explain some of the huge
dierences in measured plant level TFP. Following Aoki et al. (2009) we set
a value for aH=aL = 1:1 implying a substantial cross-sectional dispersion in
plant level TFP in the model.
We calibrate the remaining 6 parameters in order to match the steady state
predictions of the model in the absence of bubbles to 7 moments in the US
data. These are (1) the real loan rate minus the growth rate of real GDP;
(2) the real deposit rate minus the growth rate of real GDP; (3) commercial
bank leverage; (4) average corporate leverage; (5) average leverage for highly
21leveraged corporates; (6) the rate of return on bank equity and (7) the ratio
of M2 to GDP. Full details of data sources and construction are available in
Appendix A. Table 1 below presents the values of the parameters chosen to
match the moments.











Table 2 below presents the moments in the model and the data.
Table 2: Model and data moments
Moment (Model concept) Data Model
Real loan rate - real GDP growth (Rl) 0.950 0.983
Real loan rate - real GDP growth (Rd) 0.998 0.997
Ratio of M2 to GDP (D=Y ) 0.500 0.465
Bank leverage (D=N) 10.00 10.00
Average corporate leverage (L=Z) 0.500 0.530
Leverage of indebted corporates (L=(sZ)) 2.000 2.000





(1 ) ) 1.150 1.154
225 Banks' Bubble Holdings and Financial Sta-
bility
In this section we characterise the dynamics of the economy in which bubbles
circulate. One of the key questions of our paper is how the impact of asset price
bubbles on nancial stability depends on who holds the bubble. So in the next
subsections we examine the eects of the emergence and bursting of dierent
bubbles. In all experiments we assume that the currently productive agents are
endowed with intrinsically useless `zero dividend' assets. We assume that the
model is initially in a steady state in which investor sentiment regarding the
future resaleability of these assets is pessimistic and so they have zero market
value. In addition, we assume that investor sentiment suddenly changes and
the `bubble' asset starts to trade at a positive value.




In our rst experiment (described in Figures 3a and 3b above), we consider
a situation in which investor sentiment shifts in favour of indivisible assets that
can only be purchased by banks that pool the savings of many dierent small
savers. Investor sentiment remains positive for ten periods and then turns
negative again. At this point the bubble collapses. All the above events occur
in a wholly unexpected (one time shock) fashion.
When the bubble rst appears, productive entrepreneurs become very rich
because they create and sell bubbles. This represents a pure wealth gain, and,
23because collateral constraints continue to bind under small enough bubbles,
productive agents leverage up their increased net worth to raise borrowing
and employment. Initially, banks' net worth is limited and this restricts the
amount of loans they can supply while also purchasing bubbles from produc-
tive entrepreneurs. Therefore, the lending rate increases sharply, and, in order
to compete with the loan rate, the bubble grows rapidly over time. For one
period, banks make a huge prot due to the increased spread between the loan
rate and deposit rate. In turn, this rise in current and expected future prof-
itability increases the franchise value of the bank (represented by t), relaxes
the bank's collateral constraint and leads to a sharp increase in leverage. So
the appearance of the bubble and the associated sharp rise in bank protability
and leverage allows banks to raise a lot more deposits and nance an increase
in both lending and bubble holdings. Despite the fact that the bubble has to
compete with loans in banks portfolios, its appearance leads to a `crowding in'
eect, which increases lending and investment in two ways. One is through the
increase in investor net worth, leading to higher corporate borrowing capacity.
The second is through the increase in the franchise value of the banks, leading
to higher loan supply.
In subsequent periods, higher bank prots increase bank capital and allow
for a rapid expansion of lending as the loan rate and bank leverage go down.
As the productive entrepreneurs expand their employment, the employment of
the unproductive entrepreneurs is crowded out. This improves the aggregate
eciency of the economy and TFP increases. As a result, output expands.
A number of papers, starting with Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) have shown
that when credit frictions prevent the most productive rms from purchas-
ing all factors of production, the economy may experience endogenous credit
cycles that look very similar to conventional technology shocks. This hap-
24pens because, as the net worth and borrowing capacity of high productivity
agents increases, they increase their productive activities at the expense of low
productivity agents. This resource re-allocation improves aggregate eciency
and leads to an increase in output. More recently, Ventura (2010) and Mar-
tin and Ventura (2010) have applied this argument in the case of bubbles in
economies with credit frictions. They show that the emergence of bubbles can
lead to a large reallocation of resources towards more productive use, increas-
ing economy-wide TFP. Conversely, the collapse of bubbles can shift resources
into less productive rms, leading to a reduction in aggregate eciency. Our
model shares a similar property.
After ten periods in a `bubbly equilibrium' we assume that investor senti-
ment suddenly and unexpectedly turns and the bubble collapses to zero. When
the bubble bursts, the banks that own it experience a massive decline in their
net worth. In our model the loss is so large that the banks become insolvent
in the absence of government intervention. In order to prevent this we assume
that the government gives them a bail out which it nances by raising lump
sum taxes from all entrepreneurs in the model. In the interests of realism, we
assume that the bail out is not large enough to maintain bank net worth. As a
result, bank capital falls sharply and this leads to a credit crunch characterised
by a spike in lending-deposit spreads and in bank leverage. High-productivity
entrepreneurs' employment decreases sharply due to the credit crunch. Since
the entrepreneurs do not hold bubbles their net worth is not directly aected
by the collapse of bubbles. So the decrease in employment and output is driven
entirely by the credit crunch.
255.2 The emergence and bursting of a `saver bubble'
In the previous subsection we examined the behaviour of the economy under
a bubble which is only held by the banking system. The emergence of such a
bubble is initially very good for banks because it provides them with unique
access to an alternative store of value, raising their prots and net worth in
the process. But many real world bubbles do not fall under such a `limited
participation' description. For example equity bubbles can be held by any
investor, no matter how small. This raises an important question. How much
should we worry about such `equity' as opposed to `credit' bubbles?
In this subsection we experiment with the emergence and bursting of a
`divisible' bubble, which can be directly held by low productivity savers. We
show that banks may or may not join in the bubble depending on their prof-
itability. In what follows we compare the eects of a `bank-held' bubble with
the eects of a `saver-held' bubble.
[Figure 4a here]
The most striking feature of the evolution of the real variables during the
bubble's emergence is that the saver-held bubble does not lead to such violent

uctuations in output and TFP. The bursting of the bubble in period 10 hardly
aects the path of output. Even without the bursting of the bubble, output
would have been on a gentle downward trajectory. The collapse does very little
to change the economy's course. This ts well with the experience during the
1998-2002 period. After a period of vigorous growth and very high investment,
the collapse of the tech bubble led to a relatively mild recession in comparison
with the Great Contraction. The model simulations conrm this hypothesis.
Under the bank-held bubble, the bust leads to a big fall in the net worth of
banks and a credit crunch that sharply reduces output and TFP. A bubble that
is only held by unleveraged savers has none of these undesirable consequences
26for nancial stability.
[Figure 4b here]
The dierences between the evolution of nancial variables allow us to gain
a better understanding into why the real eects of the two types of bubbles
are so dierent. During the bubble, bank balance sheets expand more dramat-
ically when banks are directly involved (leverage and money to GDP ratios all
increase substantially). Loans to the `real' sector grow faster under the saver
held case because they do not have to compete with bubbles on banks' bal-
ance sheets. But total bank assets (bubbles as well as `real' loans) grow more
rapidly under the bank-held bubble. Bank protability is extremely strong
under both scenarios underpinned by strong loan demand from entrepreneurs
with sharply higher net worth due to the prots from their recent bubble sales.
This, as well as higher leverage, is why banks' net worth increases by more
when banks hold the bubbles.
Just like in the previous section, here we burst the bubble after 10 periods
in order to examine its eects on the economy. The ratios of loans and money
to GDP decline gradually when savers hold bubbles. The fall is much sharper
when banks intermediate the bubble. The credit crunch leads a sharp increase
in the price of credit. Hence the economy experiences another surge in bank
leverage and bank prot margins. This helps bank capital recover after a
period of restricted bank credit and money supply.
6 Banks' Franchise Values and Bubble Hold-
ings
In the previous subsection, we noted that bubbles held by ordinary savers tend
to have more benign eects on nancial stability compared to `bank bubbles'.
27The reason for this lies in the behaviour of banks who choose not to purchase
`saver bubbles' even though they have the opportunity to do so. `Saver bub-
bles' earn the same rate of return as deposits which is lower than the loan rate
as long as the borrowing constraint on the banks is binding. So banks choose
rationally not to buy these bubbles, instead focusing on their traditional (and
much more protable) activity - loans to entrepreneurs. As Gorton (2010)
has emphasised, protecting banks from competition creates a `franchise value'
(the NPV of excess prots from `traditional' banking activities) which prevents
banks from investing in bubbly assets. Since 1980, however, nancial markets
have become increasingly de-regulated, putting pressure on bank protabil-
ity. At the same time, the frequency and severity of nancial crises has risen,
producing a number of historical episodes in which there seems to be some
relationship between de-regulation and nancial crisis. In this section we ex-
tend our model to allow for direct nance and examine how changes in this
non-bank intermediation aects banks' protability, franchise value and incen-
tive to hold bubbles. It is shown that the nancial liberalisation of this form
endogenously induce the banks to invest in saver bubbles.
6.1 Financial Liberalisation and Banks' Franchise Value
in the US
Before extending our model, we brie
y review how the protability of the US
banks have been aected by nancial liberalisation. In the US, traditional
commercial banks have found themselves increasingly competing with other
nance providers since 1980. Figure 5 below shows how the corporate bond
market has grown relative to commercial bank credit since the Second World
War. Despite recent volatility in the size of the outstanding stock of corporate
28bonds relative to bank loans, we can clearly see that it has risen by 10-15
percentage points since the early 1980s.
[Figure 5 here]
Banks responded to this development by concentrating on real estate lend-
ing. Figure 6 below shows how around the time when the corporate bond
market grew very sharply, banks switched their portfolios away from commer-
cial and industrial loans (which fell from 40% to 17% of total loans) towards
real estate loans (which rose from 25% to around 60% of total loans).
[Figure 6 here]
Banks, however, continued to face competition from further nancial inno-
vation. Securitisation started to grow in earnest around 1990 as shown by the
expanding balance sheets of ABS issuers and broker-dealers (Figure 9 below).
The growth of these `shadow bank' entities was especially rapid after 2003.
For example ABS issuers' balance sheets expanded from around 30% of bank
assets in 2003 to 45% of bank assets in 2007, before collapsing back to 25%
during the crisis. The growth of ABS increased especially the competition
banks faced in the mortgage market which by then had become their largest
source of lending business.
[Figure 7 here]
FDIC data presented in Figure 8 below sheds more light on the eect of
growing competition on banks' protability. Net interest income declined as
a percentage of bank equity from a peak of over 50% in the late 1980s to
25% in recent years. At the same time, banks started to lend to more risky
borrowers as evidenced by the growing loss provisions. After accounting for
loss provisions, net interest income peaked in 1980 at 50% declined sharply
to almost 10% during the crisis. Non-interest income helped banks maintain
protability until 2000 but has been declining as a share of bank equity since
29then.
[Figure 8 here]
As well as increasing fee income, banks responded to the increased compe-
tition by cutting costs. The FDIC data shows that non-interest costs declined
from 50% to 25% of bank equity. This helped their net return on equity climb
to record levels before the nancial crisis hit in 2008 (see Figure 9 below).
With the benet of hindsight, we now know that banks' strong protability
was driven by a combination of risky asset holdings and high leverage. In the
next subsection we show that our model is capable of explaining qualitatively
these features of the data.
[Figure 9 here]
6.2 The Model with Direct Finance5
In order to analyse the eect of direct nance on the equilibrium of our econ-
omy, we assume that ordinary savers are able to enforce debt repayments up









t is the interest rate on direct loans from savers (we can think of these
as `corporate bonds') and bm
t is the quantity of direct loans. Banks still exist
in this economy because they have superior intermediation technology which









t is the interest rate on bank loans and bl
t is the quantity of bank loans.
5More details on the model with direct nance can be made available upon request.
30It is easy to see that arbitrage by savers implies that corporate bond and






while bank debt will remain more expensive. When the rate of return on the
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bank debt capacity after they have exhausted their market borrowing capac-
ity. Firms always prefer to borrow from the market because it is cheaper but if
their productive opportunities are good enough, bank borrowing is attractive








then they are indierent between borrowing from banks and issuing corporate
bonds.
6.3 A Financial Liberalisation Simulation
With the above brief outline of our direct nance economy in mind, we now
continue to analyse the impact of a `disintermediation shock' (an increase in
31
m holding 
l xed) on banks' incentives to hold bubbles despite competition
from ordinary savers. The experiment we conduct is the following. In the
rst period of the simulation the economy experiences positive investor sen-
timent and this leads to the emergence of a bubble which is held by savers
but not by banks. Then two periods into the bubble, the economy experiences
a `disintermediation shock' which allows some direct lending between savers
and borrowers. Two periods later, the bubble bursts and the degree of direct
intermediation returns to its initial value of zero.
Figure 10 below displays the evolution of bank net worth and its portfolio
composition under this scenario. We can see that the banks do not join in
the bubble until direct intermediation starts to grow. At this point, banks
purchase almost all of the available bubbles in circulation, allocating to them
a sum equal to around three quarters of bank capital. In terms of absolute
magnitudes, banks' bubble holdings remain small. Due to leverage, however,
the presence of bubbles in bank portfolios leaves them very exposed to a loss
of condence in the bubble's future acceptance value. When the bubble nally
collapses, bank net worth falls sharply, causing a credit crunch in the economy.
[Figure 10 here]
As Figure 11a below shows, the fall in bank capital leads to a contraction
in the supply of credit and a re-allocation of employment from high to low
productivity entrepreneurs. As a result, TFP declines and the only thing that
prevents a big collapse in output is the fact that the decline in the eciency
of the economy's savings technology forces `savers' to raise the amount they
save through inecient production.
[Figure 11a here]
But why did banks suddenly choose to invest into the bubble following
`nancial liberalisation' whereas previously they had stayed on the sidelines
32of the boom? Figure 11b below provides some answers to this question by
delving more deeply into the nancial side of the model. In particular, the
evolution of bank prot margins is key to understanding the reasons for this
sudden change of bank behaviour.
When the bubble rst appears, the rise in productive agents' net worth
increases credit demand and boosts bank prot margins. Since traditional
lending is so much more protable than bubbles (which earn the deposit rate
since `savers' are able to hold them), banks rationally hold no bubbles on their
balance sheets. However the growth of direct nancing increases the supply
of credit for borrowers as well as the supply of means of saving for savers.
Higher loan and deposit supply brings bank protability (as measured by loan-
deposit spreads) down. As a result, the lending rate temporarily becomes
equal to the deposit rate and the rate of return on bubbles6. At this point,
nancial intermediaries become indierent between expanding their balance
sheets on the margin because their capital constraint is slack. Lending to
`real entrepreneurs' is demand determined and xed by entrepreneurs' net
worth. So the only way in which banks can expand balance sheets is by issuing
deposits to the unproductive agents and purchasing bubbles from them with
the proceeds. Unproductive agents are themselves indierent between deposits
and bubbles and so would be happy to change their portfolios in this way
without demanding a change in relative rates of return.
[Figure 11b here]
While the bubble continues, such a `reshuing' of the portfolios of banks
and savers has no consequences for prices and real allocations. Therefore, the
share of the bubble held by banks is indeterminate up until the point where
6Given sucient time, the credit market liberalisation would increase the net worth of
the corporate sector boosting credit demand. At this point, bank prot margins will recover
to some extent although they will still remain below pre-liberalisation levels.
33banks' balance sheet constraint starts to bind. In the above simulation, we
have assumed that banks expand their balance sheets to buy bubbles as much
as they can. Therefore, this experiment represents an upper bound on the
risks to nancial stability from `saver bubbles'.
6.4 Poor bank protability increases the risks of nan-
cial instability
Our model implies that `saver bubbles' may or may not carry risks for -
nancial stability, depending on the level of bank protability. Less protable
banking systems are more likely to invest in bubbly assets and expose their
net worth to a possible bubble collapse. Our model suggests several dierent
channels through which protability might be eroded leading to banks invest-
ing in bubbly assets: (i) an increase in bank competition7; (ii) relaxation of
the bank's leverage constraint and (iii) weakness in corporate balance sheets.
It is straightforward to see why these three factors would reduce banks' prots
from corporate lending. (i) and (ii) increase the supply of loans and reduce
the loan-deposit spread. (iii) reduces loan demand with the same downward
impact on bank's lending margins. In all of these situations, poor protability
makes banks more willing to hold bubble assets.
7For the eects of bank competition on bank riskiness see (Boyd and De Nicolo (2009)).
The literature identies two osetting channels. First of all, more bank competition implies
a lower franchise value of the bank leading to more risk taking. But there is a second eect
working in the opposite direction. More bank competition will lead to lower loan rates and
this may reduce the riskiness of the bank's loan portfolio, making the bank safer overall.
Our model introduces some new channels linking banking sector competition with bank
riskiness that have not hitherto been explored in the literature.
For us, more competition reduces prots from traditional lending and may tempt banks
into investing in bubble assets. This increases the risk that the bubble may burst and reduce
bank net worth. But there is an osetting eect. More bank competition, reduces the value
of the rm and, in the Gertler and Karadi (2009) framework, this leads to lower leverage.
As a result, experiencing the same loan loss would have a smaller impact on bank capital.
346.5 Summary
Table 3 provides a summary of the main conclusions of our analysis.
Table 3. Types of bubbles and their propagation
Bank bubble Saver bubble
Banks Boom: "" D, Y , TFP Boom: " D, Y , TFP
hold bubbles (banks always hold) (banks hold if Rl = Rd)
Bust: Very costly Bust: Costly if big exposure
Banks do not Boom: " D, Y , TFP
hold bubbles - (banks don't hold if Rl > Rd)
Bust: Not costly
7 Conclusions
In this paper we build a model in which rational asset price bubbles arise
due to credit frictions. Our framework models nancial intermediaries in an
explicit manner in order to formalise the intuition that asset prices held by
leveraged nancial intermediaries pose the biggest threat to nancial stabil-
ity. In contrast, if unleveraged savers hold bubbles, the collapse of bubbles
has relatively few consequences for nancial intermediation and for the sol-
vency of the banking system. We show that, in normal times, banks unique
position in the nancial system creates excess prots whose `franchise value'
prevents banks from investing in bubbly assets. Economic shocks that reduce
these excess prots and consequently diminish banks' franchise values increase
the likelihood that banks will hold bubbles. This explains why, historically,
nancial liberalisation and de-regulation are often followed by banking crises.
Our model provides a rich array of theoretical predictions regarding the
impact of dierent types of bubbles on real and nancial variables. These
35can be useful in interpreting the results of the growing literature on `early
warning indicators' of nancial crises8. Most of the existing studies naturally
utilise a largely atheoretic approach, focusing on nding robust crisis predic-
tors without necessarily spelling out the underlying mechanism by which such
predictors are related to the eventual occurrence of nancial crisis. Our paper
can provide some theoretical backing and interpretation behind some of these
`early warning signals' of nancial instability. Our model implies that large
bank balance sheet expansions signal the presence of a bubble in the economy.
A thorough investigation into the early warning indicators is left for future
research.
Finally, our paper also makes a contribution to the literature that attempts
to explain why asset price bubbles tend to be expansionary in reality rather
than contractionary as early rational bubble theories implied. We show that
the presence of banks enhances bank excess returns which are collateralisable.
We show that bubbles are therefore more likely to be expansionary in a frame-
work that models banks explicitly.
8See, for example, Borio and Lowe (2002), Alessi and Detken (2009).
368 Appendix A: Data
In this section we provide details of the sources of the data used for calibrating
the model. This is given in Table A1 below:
Table A1:
Theor. concept Data concept Source
Nominal bank
loan rate




M2 own rate FRED
Expected in






Average real GDP growth
(chained measure)
FRED
Deposit stock M2 FRED
Nominal GDP Nominal GDP FRED
Bank leverage Bank Debt Liabilities/Bank
Net Worth










for the largest corporates
Covas and Den haan (2011)
Bank rate of re-
turn on equity
Bank rate of return on eq-
uity
Meh and Moran (2010)
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Figure 1. US asset prices and output
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Figure 2a. Deposit rate less than one (red area)
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Figure 2b. Lending rate less than one (red area)

























Figure 3a: Real variables: bank-bubble






























Figure 3b. Financial variables: bank-held bubble



























Figure 4a. Real variables: bank-held (solid) vs saver-held (dashed) bubbles
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Figure 9: Banks ￿net pro￿t as a % of total equity
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Figure 10: A boom in non-bank lending


























Figure 11a: Evolution of real variables during a boom in non-bank lending































Figure 11b: Evolution of ￿nancial variables in a boom in non-bank lending
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